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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

CONSTITUTIONAL INSURANCE FOR A SAFE
TREATY-MAKING POLICY
By
HON. JOHN

W. BRICKER*

For more than four years lawyers and laymen have vigorously debated
proposed constitutional amendments to safeguard the exercise of the treatymaking power.'
Unfortunately, sharp differences of opinion on the need for an amendment have obscured the substantial agreement which exists on the essential
elements of a safe treaty-making policy. The generally desired limitations on
the treaty-making power of the United States may be summarized as follows:
First, no treaty or other international agreement should be valid if it
conflicts with the Constitution of the United States.
Second, treaties and other international agreements should be limited to
problems of genuine international concern which cannot be solved except by
negotiation and contract between sovereign nations.
Third, international agreements should not be used to take powers away
from the States and give them to the Federal government.
Fourth, no treaty or other international agreement should be effective to
surrender the sovereignty of the United States to any world or regional superstate.
These characteristics of a safe treaty-making policy are recognized and respected by the Eisenhower Administration and by the Congressional proponents
of amendment. Two questions are left to be decided in the current debate:
1. Does the Constitution, without amendment, confine the power to make
international agreements within the boundaries of safety noted above?
2. If not, should adherence to a safe treaty-making policy be enforced by
constitutional mandate or depend wholly on the pressure of public opinion? 2
* United States Senator from Ohio. A. B. 1916, LL.B. 1920, Ohio State University. Member

of the Ohio Bar.
1 "Perdition if Passed, Doom if Defeated" is an apt description of the heated debate in the
publisher's introduction to MAcBRIDE, TREATIES VERSUS THE CONSTITUTION (1955). Hearings
on proposed constitutional amendments to limit the treaty power were held in the 82nd (on S.
J. Res. 130), 83rd (on S. J. Res. 1 and S. J. Res. 43), and 84th (on S. J. Res. 1) Congresses
by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Records of these hearings are cited hereinafter as
Hearings I, Hearings II, and Hearings III, respectively. For the legislative history and text of
earlier proposals, see Hearings III, 13-15, 569, 570 and HOLMAN, STORY OF THE "BRICKER"
AMENDMENT (1954).
2 Neither the Constitution nor public opinion can insure that no unwise or dangerous inter.
national agreement will ever be made. This article is concerned only with what the primary restraints against abuse of the treaty power should be.
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Before discussing the two questions at issue in this debate, it may be
helpful to review the pertinent provisions of the Constitution and the text
and status of the principal proposed amendment. 8
The ConstitutionalProvisions Involved
Article II, section

2,

gives the President power to make treaties, "...

by

and with the advice and consent of the Senate [provided that] two-thirds of
4
the Senators present concur."
Article III, section 2, provides that the judicial power of the United States
*..

shall extend to all cases arising under . . . treaties made or which shall

be made ......
under the authority of the United States. The Supreme Court
has never held any provision of any treaty unconstitutional. Moreover, the Court
has shown an increasing disposition to hold that international agreements raise
"political" issues which the judiciary is not competent to resolve. 5
Article VI, paragraph 2, reads as follows:
"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be

made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme

Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

The framers of the Constitution could not say that treaties, like Acts of
Congress, must be made "in pursuance" of the Constitution. That phraseology
would have cast doubt on the validity of pre-1787 treaties made under the Articles of Confederation. No provision of the Constitution was more fully discussed in the Constitutional Convention than the supremacy clause. However,
the records of the convention fail to disclose that any thought was given to

the relative supremacy of the Constitution and treaties made under its authority. What would happen in the event of a conflict between treaties and the

Constitution was never discussed. 6 In their labors on the supremacy clause, the
delegates at Philadelphia were concerned exclusively with what types of law
3 S. J. Res. 1, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
4 in 1952, a treaty was approved with only two Senators present on the Floor, one of whom
was the Presiding Officer. See statement of Senator Edward J. Thye, 100 Cong. Rec. 2236 (Feb.
25, 1954).
5 See, e.g., Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 111 (1948),
where the Court refused to exercise a clear statutory power to review on the ground that: "...
the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions
are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative . . . They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities, nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of
political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry."
6 The possibility of a conflict between the terms of a treaty and the provisions of the Constitution was discussed in a number of state ratifying conventions and was one of the main reasons for the addition of the Bill of Rights. See statement of Dr. George A. Finch, Hearings I,
318-324.
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should be binding on the States and how such "supreme law" should be en7
forced.
Artide I, section 10, provides that "No State shall enter into any Treaty
[or] without the Consent 'of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement
....
or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power." This is the sole constitutional reference to international agreements other than treaties. While the
power to conclude international agreements other than treaties has been recognized from the very beginning,8 the line of demarcation between treaties and
executive agreements, or whether such a line exists, has been perennially and
hotly debated. 9 The current debate is most often described as one on "treaty
law." This short-hand expression must not obscure the fact that executive agreements, not ratified by either House of Congress, are a far greater source of
danger than treaties.
Artide V of the Constitution specifies the procedure for its amendment.
Utilization of that procedure is the most solemn political act of which the American people are capable. Proponents of a treaty-control amendment are following that procedure. Obviously, they are not attacking the Constitution, as claimed
by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. 10 Nor have they "assaulted . . . government itself" as charged by former Secretary of State Dean
Acheson." The charge is ridiculous on its face and demagogic in character. Would
it be contended that proponents of the 13th Amendment to abolish slavery attacked the Constitution or assaulted government? Only on the theory that the
Constitution belongs to the government rather than the people can a formal
amendment to that document be described as an assault upon government itself.
'7 For an excellent review of the discussions in the Constitutional Convention relative to the
supremacy clause, see MAcBiME, supra note 1, at 25-38.
8 When the first Congress established the Post Office, it authorized the Postmaster General to
make international agreements with the Postmasters of foreign countries for the reciprocal receipt

and delivery of mail. 1 STAT. 232, 239.
9 In support of the theory that treaties and executive agreements are wholly interchangeable instruments of national policy, see MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS (1941)

378; McDougal and Lans, Treaties and Congressional Executive or Presidential Agreements, 54
YALE L. J. 181, 534 (1945). Contra: Bricker, Making Treaties and Other International Agreements, 289 Annals 134, 140-144 (1953). Secretary of State Dulles, while denying that treaties
and executive agreements are interchangeable, maintains that the President alone has power to
decide what international agreements require Senate or Congressional approval and what agreements may be concluded without the consent of either House of Congress. See Hearings II, 828,
829.
10 The Association of the Bar of the City of New York entitled its 1955 report in opposition to
S.J.Res. 1: "A Continued Defense of the Constitution Against the Bricker Proposals." See Hearings III, 577.
11 See Acheson, The Parties and Foreign Poliay, Harper's Magazine, Nov. 1955, pp. 29, 30. Mr.
Acheson ignored the record in describing the alleged assault on government as Republican. If he
had consulted the Congressional Record he would have found that 64% of thd Democratic Senators present and 69% of the Republican Senators voted for the amendment on final passage. 100
Cong. Rec. 2374 (Feb. 26, 1954). Senator Wayne Morse, then an "independent," is not included
in the above percentages.
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Text and Status of the ProposedAmendment
The author, on January 6, 1955, reintroduced in the 84th Congress a proposed constitutional amendment (S. J. Res. 1) containing these provisions:
"Section 1. A provision of a treaty or other international agreement
which conflicts wit this Constitution, or which is not made in pursuance thereof, shall not be the supreme law of the land nor be of any
force or effect.
"Sec. 2. A treaty or other international agreement shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation
valid in the absence of international agreement.
"Sec. 3. On the question of advising and consenting to the ratification of a treaty, the vote shall be determined by yeas and nays, and
voting for and against shall be entered on the
the names of the persons
12
Journal of the Senate."'
In the 83rd Congress, the Senate voted on a modified version of the above
text. On final passage, the substitute amendment of Senator Walter F. George
fell one vote short of gaining the necessary two-thirds margin-60 Senators voting "yea" and 31 opposed.' 8 The only substantial difference between the text
of S. J. Res. 1, quoted above, and the George substitute was that section 2
of the latter proposal applied only to international agreements other than treaties.
Hearings on S. J. Res. 1 in the 84th Congress were held before a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee in April and May, 1955.14 On May
23, 1955, the subcommittee approved S. J. Res. 1 without any change in text.
As of this writing, the resolution is awaiting action by the full Senate judiciary Committee.
Joint resolutions having the same general purpose and effect as S. J. Res.
1 have been introduced in the House of Representatives.' 5 None of these proposals has reached the hearing stage.
President Eisenhower has said that he would support a constitutional amendment providing that a treaty or other international agreement which conflicts
with the Constitution shall not be of any force or effect.' 6 When such a provision, standing alone, was voted on in the 83rd Congress, it passed the Senate
by the comfortable margin of 62 to 20.1
12 An identical text is S. J. Res. 181 of the 83rd Congress introduced and explained in the Senate
on August 6, 1954. 100 Cong. Rec. 13456.
13 100 Cong. Rec. 2374 (Feb. 26, 1954).
14 Members of the subcommittee were Senators Kefauver (Chairman), Hennings, Daniel, Langer,
and Dirksen.
15 H. J. Res. Nos. 23, 33, 41, 59, 60, 96, 99, 103, 111, 172, and 269 introduced at various times
during the first session of the 84th Congress.
16 N. Y. Times, July 23, 1953, p. 12, col. 6.
17 100 Cong. Rec. 1740 (Feb. 15, 1954).
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DOES THE CONSTITUTION, WITHOUT AMENDMENT,
ADEQUATELY SAFEGUARD THE EXERCISE OF
THE TREATY-MAKING POWER?
No matter how the Constitution reads, courts will always be reluctant to
declare any treaty provision null and void. Such a holding would dishonor
the Nation's promise and invite reprisals by the other contracting parties, the
provisions of our Constitution to the contrary notwithstanding. Nevertheless,
constitutional restraints on treaty-making are essential. First, the constitutional command, if clearly understood, will almost invariably be obeyed by the
political departments of government. And secondly, the courts, while loathe
to invalidate any international agreement, would be encouraged to grant full
judicial review and to interpret the agreement as not abridging the litigant's
constitutional rights.
Is a treaty or other international agreement -which conflicts with the Constitution
null and void?
This question first came to the Supreme Court in 1796 in Ware v. Hylton. 18 After much soul-searching the Court provided a negative answer.
In 1774, Hylton and Company gave a $15,000 promissory note to their
British creditors. During the Revolutionary War, Hylton discharged this debt
by payment of $3,000 to the State of Virginia under its law that such payment would discharge the American debtor. The Ware case arose under this
clause of the Treaty of Peace with England:
"It is agreed that creditors, on either side, shall meet with no
lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value, in sterling money,
of all bona fide debts, heretofore contracted."
The Supreme Court refused to allow Hylton's plea in bar based on the
discharge pursuant to Virginia law. Since the Court required Hylton to pay the
same debt twice, it would be hard to find a clearer deprivation of property
without due process of law. The significance of the Ware case in the current
debate on treaty law is weakened somewhat by the fact that Marbury v. Madison 19 had not then been decided.
Throughout the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court frequently said
that a treaty could not override the Constitution. 20 The most famous dicta is
Justice Field's in Geofroy v. Riggs: "It would not be contended that it [the
treaty power of the United States] extends so far as to authorize what the
Constitution forbids ... "21 In twentieth century decisions of the Supreme
Court, such dicta is conspicuous by its absence.
18 3 Dall. 199 (U. S. 1796).
19 1 Cranch 137 (U. S. 1803).
20 See Doe v. Braden, 16 How. 635, 657 (U. S. 1853) ; Prevost v. Greneaux, 19 How. 1, 7 (U.
S. 1856); Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 197 (U. S. 1856); The Cherokee Tobacco, 11
Wall. 616, 620 (U. S. 1870); Holden v. Joy, 17 Wall. 211, 243 (U. S. 1872); Chae Chan Ping
v. United States, 130 U. S. 581, 600 (1889).
21 133 U. S. 258, 267 (1890).
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The turning point came in the celebrated case of Missouri v. Holland.22
The facts were these: In 1913 Congress enacted legislation to protect game
birds migrating between the United States and Canada. Several State and lower
Federal courts held the act unconstitutional on the ground that it invaded powers reserved to the States. 23 Fearing that the Supreme Court would reach a
similar conclusion, the Federal government entered into the Migratory Bird
Treaty with Great Britain (acting for Canada).24 Congress, armed with treaty
power, re-enacted legislation similar to that which had been challenged. It
was this second act which was upheld in the Holland case.
Mr. Justice Holmes first pointed out that if the treaty were valid the
implementing statute would also be constitutional. He assumed, for purposes
of the case, that Congress had no power to enact the statute in the absence of
treaty. To the argument of Jefferson, urged by Missouri, that ". . . surely the
President and the Senate cannot do what the whole government is interdicted
from doing in any way," Holmes replied:
"Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land, only when made
in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so
when made under the authority of the United States. It is open to question whether the authority of the United States
means more than the
25
formal acts required to make the convention."
Mr. Justice Holmes disavowed any implication that

"...

there are no quali-

fications to the treaty-making power" and observed that the treaty did not "...
contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution." After the
Holland case however, all attempts to find some logical ground for implying limitations on the treaty power have failed. In 1929 Charles Evans Hughes said:
"I should not care to voice any opinion as to an implied limitation on the treaty-making ower. The Supreme Court has expressed a
doubt whether there could be any
such. That is, the doubt has been ex26
pressed in one of its opinions."
22 252 U. S. 416 (1920).
23 State v. Sawyer, 113 Me. 458, 94 At. 886 (1915) ; State v. McCullagh, 96 Kan. 786, 153 Pac.
557 (1915) ; United States v. Shauver, 214 Fed. 154 (D. Ark 1914) ; United States v. McCullagh,
221 Fed. 288 (D. Kan. 1915).
24 Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds of Aug. 16, 1916, 39 STAT. 1702. Mr. John
W. Davis, who was Solicitor General of the United States when the first migratory bird legislation was challenged in the courts, had this recollection of his role in the events culminating in
the case of Missouri v. Holland:
"I took it upon myself, and this is my only responsibility in the matter and it is
a very slight one, to march over to the Department of State and say to them-I think it
was to Secretary Lansing in person although I am a little foggy in my recollection about
it-that if he would negotiate a treaty with Canada providing for the protection of these
migratory animals which neither country was able to protect alone, and if under that
treaty Congress should be empowered to pass a statute for their protection, I thought
it would stand up, and it was so done." (Report of Committee on International Law
and Discussion of Resolution, N. Y. State Bar Association, Jan. 30, 1953, p. 60,
quoted in Hearings III at 139).
25 252 U. S. at 433 (1920).
26 Address before the American Society of International Law reprinted in part in Hearings II
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The next step in unshackling the treaty power from constitutional restraints
came in 1936. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., Mr. Justice
Sutherland stated that ". . . the investment of the Federal Government with
the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants
of the Constitution."-2 7 The theory expounded in the Curtiss-Wright case-that
treaty-making powers belong to the Federal government "as the necessary concomitants of nationality"-has been interpreted by a leading opponent of amendment, Professor Edward S. Corwin, as leaving "even less room for the notion
28
of a limited treaty-making power."
The supremacy of the Constitution over international agreements other
than treaties was the issue in United States v. Pink.2 9 The Court found, first,
that an executive agreement not ratified by either House of Congress became,
like a treaty, the "supreme law of the land." The Court held that the executive agreement between President Roosevelt and Maxim Litvinov divested alien
creditors of property awarded to them by the highest court of New York. Though
recognizing that the Fifth Amendment protects the property of aliens located
in the United States, the Supreme Court stated:
"If the President had the power to determine the policy which
was to govern the question of recognition, then the fifth amendment
does not stand in the way of giving full force and effect to the Litvinoff
assignment." 80
Another leading opponent of my amendment, Professor Philip Jessup,
said of the Pink case:
"From the point of view of our constitutional law, the decision
may well mark one of the most far reaching inroads upon the protection
which81 it was supposed the fifth amendment accorded to private property."
In the light of the Holland, Curtiss-Wright and Pink cases, Mr. John Fos.
ter Dulles was on firm ground when he said:
"The treaty-making power is an extraordinary power, liable to abuse.
Treaties . . .are, indeed, more supreme than ordinary laws for congressional laws are invalid if they do not conform to the Constitution, whereas treaty law can override the Constitution. Treaties, for example, can
at 52. As indicative of the change effected by Missouri v. Holland compare the statement in
New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662, 736 (U. S. 1836):
"Congress cannot by legislation, enlarge the Federal jurisdiction nor can it be enlarged under the treaty-making power."
with the following statement from United States v. Reid, 73 F. 2d 153, 155 (9th Cir. 1934):
"It is doubtful if the courts have power to declare the plain terms of a treaty
void..."
27 299 U. S. 304, 318 (193().
28 THE CONSTITUTION OF -THE UNITED STATES, REVISED AND ANNOTATED,

Edward S. Corwin, p. 429.
29 315 U. S. 203 (1942).
so Id. at 228.
81 36 Am. J. INT'L L. 282 (1942).

1952, edited by

VOL. 60

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

. . . cut across the rights given the people by their constitutional Bill of
2

Rights."8
We do not need to decide whether Mr. Dulles was right before or after
he became Secretary of State. A reasonable doubt as to the supremacy of the
believe that
Constitution exists. With rare exceptions, opponents of amendment
83
the Constitution should be the one supreme law of the land.

It must still

be determined, however, whether the loophole in our Constitution should be
closed by adding new language to the Constitution, or whether political action
should be the exclusive safeguard against exploitation of the loophole.
Is the power to make international agreements limited to particular subjects?

Many opponents of amendment contend that the power to make international agreements extends only to those fields ".

.

. which may properly be

34

the subject of negotiation with a foreign country."
They profess to believe,
with Calhoun, that:
"Although the treaty-making power is exclusively vested and without enumeration or specification, in the Government of the United
States, it is, nevertheless, subject to several important limitations. It is,
in the first place, strictly limited to questions inter alias; that is, to
questions between us and foreign powers which require negotiation to
adjust them. But to extend it beyond these, be the pretext what it
may, would be to extend it beyond 3' the
allotted sphere, and thus a
5
palpable violation of the Constitution. "

Hamilton was more specific. He said:
"The power of making treaties . . . relates neither to the execution of the subsisting laws, nor to the enaction of new ones . . . Its

objects are contracts with foreign nations, which have the force of
law, but derive it from the obligations of good faith. They are not rules
prescribed by the sovereign
to the subject, but agreements between
sovereign and sovereign."8 6
The idea of a treaty power limited to subjects of genuine international concern is reflected in the dicta of Supreme Court cases of the last century. In
the Geofroy case for example, Mr. Justice Field saw the treaty power of the
United States extending ".

.

. to all proper subjects of negotiation between our

government and the governments of other nations." 37 Unfortunately, very few
32 Address before a Regional Meeting of the American Bar Association at Louisville, Kentucky,
April 11, 1952, reprinted in Hearings II at 862.
33 One opponent of amendment, Judge John J. Parker, apparently does not believe that the
Constitution should prevail over conflicting provisions of a treaty. He believes that the pro.
cedure of an international criminal court with jurisdiction to try American citizens for crimes
committed in the United States would not be limited by provisions of the Constitution and Bill
of Rights. See Hearings II at 726-729, 1154.
84 1955 Report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 10 at 117.
35 Quoted in MACBRIDE, supra note 1, at 34-35.
36 TiE FEDERALIST, No. 75 at 486 (Modern Library ed. 1937).
37 133 U. S. at 266 (1890). The Court, in Holden v. Joy, 17 Wall. 211, 243 (U. S. 1872),
indicated that the proper subjects of treaty negotiation were those which had beer traditionally
regarded as falling within the scope of the treaty power.
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modern authorities have ventured to suggest what might be an improper subject for treaty negotiation. And yet, as Judge Florence E. Allen has observed:
"The root of the difficulty lies in the lack of demarcation between domestic and international legislation. A line must be drawn beyond which the international organizations know they cannot pass. The
United Nations should draw the fine in a resolution of the General Assembly and should facilitate a judgment on the question by the International
Court. The United States should draw the line by amendment to the
Federal Constitution.- 88
Judging by the treaty-making activity of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, nothing is beyond the legitimate scope of the treaty power.
It is hard to find any civil, political, economic, or social right which a UN
treaty in some stage of negotiation does not propose to regulate. Notwithstanding Article 2, paragraph 7, of the UN Charter, forbidding UN intervention
in the domestic affairs of its members, 8 the view of the UN seems to be:
". . . once a matter has become, in one way or another, the subject
of regulation by the United Nations, be it by resolution of the General Assembly or by convention between member states at the instancet
of the United Nations, that subject ceases to be a matter being 'essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the Member States.' "40
A former director of the UjN's Division of Human Rights wrote with
exceptional candor:
"What the United Nations is trying to do is revolutionary in
character. Human rights are largely a matter of relationships between
the state and individuals, and therefore a matter which has been traditionally regarded as being within the domestic jurisdiction of states.
What is now being proposed is, in effect, the creation of some kind of
supernational41 supervision of this relationship between the state and
its citizens."
The protection envisioned for the United States by the domestic jurisdiction article of the Charter 42 evaporated with the official proclamation of the
Truman Administration that ". . . there is no longer any difference between
foreign and domestic affairs." 43 However, the fight for a treaty-control amendment has reversed that trend in treaty-making. Secretary Dulles has flatly repudiated the theory that ". . . there is no longer any difference between foreign and domestic affairs." In fact, Secretary Dulles believes that the Constitu38 ALLEN, THE TREATY As AN INSTRUMENT OF LEGISLATION (1952)

104-105.

S9 Article 2, paragraph 7, of the United Nations Charter provides in pertinent part as follows:
"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter ...

"

40 See Moscowitz, ls the UN's Bill of Hutnan Rights Dangerous?, 35 A. B. A. J. 283, 285 (1949).
41 Humphrey, 255 Annals 15 (1948).
42 It seems generally agreed that the Senate would not have advised and consented to ratification of the UN Charter in the absence of the protection thought to exist in Art. 2 (7).
48 STATE DEPARTMENT PUBLICATION 3972, General Foreign Policy Series 26, September 1950.
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tion, without amendment, limits the treaty power to subjects of genuine international concern. At the 1953 hearings, Mr. Dulles said:
"I do not believe that treaties should, or lawfully can, be used as a
in relation
device to circumvent the constitutional procedures established
44
to what are essentially matters of domestic concern."
Accordingly, Secretary Dulles announced that the Eisenhower Administration would not "press for ratification of the Genocide Convention" and
would not sign the UN draft Covenants on Human Rights, the UN Convention on Political Rights of Women, or other treaties designed to effectuate domestic reforms, particularly in relation to economic and social matters. 45 Attorney General Brownell also believes that certain subjects are beyond the orbit of the treaty power. He advised the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1953:
"Our Federal system did not contemplate6 having treaties deal with
matters exclusively domestic in their nature."'
Although most opponents of amendment now profess to believe that the
treaty power is limited as to subject matter, it is hard to believe that the Supreme
Court would ever hold that a duly ratified treaty involved an improper subject of negotiation. The question of what is a proper subject of negotiation
would surely be left by the courts to the President and the Senate as political
decisions and not justiciable issues. 47 Professor Corwin is unquestionably right
in his conclusion that existing constitutional limitations on the treaty power
do not ". . . appear to limit the National Government in its choice of matters concerning which it may treat with other governments.'"'48
All advocates of a treaty-control amendment and many opponents of such
an amendment agree that certain subjects of a domestic character are beyond the
proper scope of the treaty power. Here again, the issue in the current debate
treaty power be
boils down to this question: Should unrestrained use of the
49
checked by political expediency or by constitutional mandate?
Can International Agreements Take Powers from the States and Give Them to
the FederalGovernment?
All participants in the debate on S. J. Res. 1 agree that the answer to
this question is, "yes". The Supreme Court so held in the Holland case as to
treaties and in the Pink case as to executive agreements.
Nevertheless, all advocates and most opponents of a treaty-control amendment agree that the Federal Government should not destroy the constitutional
44 See Hearings II at 825.
45 Id. at 825, 878, 886.
46 Id. at 904.
47 See Magnusson,

Our Membership in the United Nations and the Pederal Treaty Power under
the Constitution, 34 VA. L. REV. 137 (1948).
48 See Corwin, supra note 28, at 429-430.
49 In 1953, with only four of fifteen Senators. dissenting, the Senate Judiciary Committee concluded that "the need for additional constitutional protection is apparent." SEN. REP. No. 412,
83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
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autonomy of the several states by treaty. The late John W. Davis claimed
credit as the inventor of the doctrine enunciated in the Holland case. 50 Mr.
Davis, an opponent of amendment, realized that the decision was a Pandora's
box. He and his colleagues on the New York State Bar Association Committee
on Amendments to the Federal Constitution joined in a report containing this
warning:
"The principle announced in Missouri v. Holland has a logical
ground and is based on express constitutional provisions. As applied
to treaties normally within the treaty power it is satisfactory enough, but if
it is to be applied to such pacts as the Covenant on Human Rights it
would be destructive of the existing division of authority between States
and Nation. In that case, to enlarge Federal power, all that would be
necessary would be for us to find some foreign nation willing to make
an agreement with us as to how we would treat our own people. Such
a distortion of the treaty power should be condemned as a mere device to enlarge Federal power at the expense of the States and not
within the treaty power." 51
Professor Corwin, a leading opponent of my amendment, also seemed a
bit disturbed about the full reach of the Holland case when he wrote:
"In a word, the treaty power cannot purport to amend the Constitution by adding to the list of Congress' enumerated powers, but having
acted, the consequence will often be that it has provided Congress wit§
an opportunity to enact measures which independently of a treaty
Congress could not pass; and the only question that can be raised as
to such measures will be whether they are 'necessary and proper'
5 2 measures for the carrying of the treaty in question into operation."
Mr. Vermont Hatch, testifying for the American Bar Association Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations, supplied this crushing rejoinder to Professor Corwin's statement:
"What difference does it make that the treaty power cannot all
at once add an entire category to Congess' enumerated powers if it
may do so piecemeal and one at a time. From the point of view of constitutional protection--or limitation-the result is exactly the same.
It's a little like the tenderhearted person who couldn't bear to cut his
dog's fine long tail off. So he compromised and cut it off an inch at a
time. Poor dog! Poor Constitution!"58
Even Professor Corwin is unwilling to extend the doctrine of the Holland
case to Presidential executive agreements as was done in the Pink case. He
says that ". . . an executive agreement which is not based upon an act of Congress or a treaty, ought not to have force and validity as internal law, capable
of affecting private rights . . ."54 Professor Corwin goes on to say that if a
constitutional amendment is necessary to reverse the Pink case it should be
50 See note 24,

supra.

51 Reprinted in part in Hearings III at 137.
52 See Corwin, supra note 28, at 427.
58 See Hearings III at 141.
54 See statement of Edwaxd S. Corwin reprinted in 100 CONG. Rac. 859 (Jan. 27, 1954).
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adopted, though he suggests that an act of Congress would probably suffice.
It is difficult to see how the Congress can deprive the President of the constitutional power conferred on him by the Pink case.
In formulating its treaty-making policy, the Eisenhower Administration has
shown great respect for the constitutional prerogatives of the States. In 1953,
five treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation-with Denmark, Ethiopia,
Greece, Israel and Japan-made the rights of aliens to acquire real property
dependent upon local laws.5 5 Even without the aid of any treaty on the subject, Congress could determine the conditions under which aliens may be permitted to reside in the United States. 56 Making treaties on a local law reciprocal basis when Congress, in the absence of treaty, has power to override local
law shows maximum respect for principle of local self-government.
The Eisenhower Administration's respect for the reserved powers of the
states has placed the United states in a rather hypocritical position in the International Labor Organization. The ILO has approved a large number of socialistic treaties. Many of these treaties deal with subjects which, in whole or
in part, fall within the constitutional domain of the several States. For example,
ILO conferences have approved conventions on safety regulations in the building industry (ILO Convention No. 63); regulation of night work of women
(No. 89); methods of wage payment (No. 95); regulation of employment agencies (No. 96); minimum wages in agriculture (No. 99); holidays with pay
in agriculture (No. 101); and maternity protection (No. 103). The ILO Constitution (Art. 19, par. 7) provides that the national government of a federal
state may fulfill its obligations to the ILO by referring to its "states, provinces
or cantons" treaties which the national government "regards as appropriate
under its constitutional system . . . for action by the constituent states, provinces, or cantons rather than or federal action." Obviously, with the power
acquired in the Holland case, all ILO treaties can be implemented by Congressional legislation. The federal-state clause in the ILO Constitution and in other
international agreements is just not applicable to the United States. How can
55 See statements of Dr. George A. Finch, Hearin.qs II at 1124-1125 and Hearings III at 506.

66 Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U. S. 410 (1948); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U. S. 52 (1941). In the Takahashi case the Supreme Court considered a California statute
denying to nationals of Japan residing in this country the right to fish off the coast of California.
No treaty was involved. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the power to determine
the conditions upon which aliens are permitted to reside in the United States and earn their living is a federal power and not a power reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment. Accordingly, under the language of Section 2 of S. J. Res. 1, Congress, and not the 48 States,
would be required to pass the legislation to implement treaties of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation guaranteeing rights to aliens residing in the United States.
Curiously enough, two opponents of my amendment, former Secretary of State Acheson
and former Solicitor General of the United States, Philip Perlman, filed briefs in the Takahashi
case. Both argued that Congress had plenary power to regulate the activities of aliens in the
United States; that the States have no constitutional power to treat aliens in a discriminatory
fashion. The Supreme Court accepted these arguments. Now, however, Mr. Acheson and Mr.
Perlman take exactly the opposite position for the purpose of defeating any treaty-control amendment.
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any treaty be appropriate for State action under our Constitution when, under
the Holland case, treaties cause State lines to disappear and are not restricted
by ". . . invisible radiation[s] from the terms of the Tenth Amendment." 57
Nothing is reserved to the States to which a Federal-State clause can apply. 58
United States participation in the International Labor Organization is somewhat hypocritical because the executive branch acts as though the Holland case
had never been decided. Notwithstanding the plenary power of Congress to
implement all ILO conventions, the State Department sends many of those conventions to the 48 State Capitols. 59
Supporters of S. J. Res. 1 and many opponents of amendment agree,
therefore, that it would be dangerous to push the doctrine of the Holland case
to its logical limits. Here again, we have the same general issue to be decided:
Should the dangerous potentialities of the Holland case be curbed by the Constitution or solely by the exercise of political discretion?
Should InternationalAgreements Be Capable of Surrendering Essential Attributes
of Sovereignty?
Nineteenth century dicta of the Supreme Court indicated that no treaty
or other international agreement could be effective to surrender sovereign powers of the United States. Justice Field, for example, noted in the Geofroy case
that the treaty power could not effect ". . a change in the character of the
government or in that of one of the States." 60 This view coincided with that
expressed by Madison at the Virginia ratifying convention: "I do not conceive that [the treaty] power is given to the President and Senate to dismember the empire, or to alienate any great, essential right.''61 Perhaps the most
positive statement of the point is the following, also by Mr. Justice Field:
"The powers of government are delegated in trust to the United
States, and are incapable of transfer to any other parties. They cannot
be abandoned or surrendered . . .The exercise of these public trusts
is not the subject of barter or contract." 62
Such reassuring dicta are notably absent from more recent decisions of the
courts. Modem legal authorities fully support Professor Corwin's conclusion that:
"The question whether the United States should enter an international organization for the promotion of peace and of what pledges
it should give with respect to the use of its constitutional powers to the
same end, is one which the appropriate agencies of the National Gov57

252 U. S. at 434 (1920).

58, This is made clear in the Report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York

supra note 10 at page 117: "Thus, the scope
under the Constitution is plenary in the sense
extends to all fields which may properly be the
59 See statement of George P. Delany, U. S.

of the treaty power of the Federal Government
that it is not confined to enumerated areas but
subject of negotiation with a foreign country."
employee delegate to the ILO, in Hearings III

at 446.
60

133 U. S. at 266-267 (1890).

61 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 514.
62

Chae Char Ping v. United States, 130 U. S. 581, 609 (1889).
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ernment are free to decide on grounds of national interest, substantially unfettered by constitutional limitations of any kind"68 (Emphasis
added).
Some proponents of world government would take advantage of the loophole in our Constitution. For example, the New York Times said editorially on
April 8, 1953:
"The resolution is dangerous because it forbids any treaty that
would allow any foreign power or any international organization (meaning the U. N. or one of its agencies) to control the constitutional
rights of American citizens within the United States 'or any other
matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United
States.' "64
Mr. Clark Eichelberger, Executive Director of the American Association
for the United Nations, has urged that the evolution of the UN into a world
government be achieved by a ". . . liberal interpretation of the Charter." 65 Dr.
Philip C. Jessup has swept aside as "obsolete" the traditional rule of international law that treaties can be amended only with the consent of the parties
thereto.6 6 Mr. Benjamin Cohen has warned against pressing for controversial amendments at the forthcoming UN Charter Review Conference because,
he says, ". . . the same purposes can be achieved through the normal evolutionary processes projected in the Charter.''67
The United World Federalists, on the other hand, disdain use of the treaty
power as a short-cut to world government. 68 The Eisenhower Administration
and other opponents of my amendment do not favor United States participation in world or regional government. They believe, moreover, that an amendment to the Constitution is the only proper way to authorize the revolutionary
steps toward world government. 69 Here is another facet of the fundamental issue in the debate on S. J. Res. 1: Should American sovereignty be protected
constitutionally or merely by political action?
SHOULD ADHERENCE TO A SAFE TREATY-MAKING
POLICY BE INSURED BY THE CONSTITUTION?
Many opponents of my amendment deny the need for constitutional insurance in treaty-making. They claim that an enlightened public opinion is an
adequate safeguard against abuse of the treaty-making power. That was Sec68 See CoRwiN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WORLD ORGANIZATION (1944) 30.
64 The editorial referred to S. J. Res. 1, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., introduced in the Senate on

January 7, 1953.
65 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Revision q/
the United Nations Charter, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) 352.
66 JEssUv, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS (1948).
67 See Cohen, Review of the UN Charter, Journal of the American Association of UniverSity
Women, October, 1954, p. 8.
68 See statement by the Lawyers' Committee of the United World Federalists in Hearings II

at 735.

69 See statement of Senator Alexander Wiley reprinted in 100

CosNq.

R.;. 1071 (Feb. 1, 1954).
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retary Dulles' opinion when he appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee in opposition to the amendment. Mr. Dulles recognized that human rights
treaties "alien to our traditional concepts" were being seriously proposed. He
graciously conceded that the concern which inspired the amendment was "legitimate"; that those who shared that concern were "alert citizens"; and that
they "performed a patriotic service in bringing their fears to the attention of
the American public." But, said Mr. Dulles:
"What has happened in recent months, including the exertions of
the proponents of the resolution, demonstrates that the resolution is
unnecessary. The trend they feared has been checked."
And he added:
"I point out that the arousing of that concern was a correction
70
of the evil."
Mr. Dulles was wrong if he was referring to the permanent correction
of evil. True, an enlightened public opinion is vitally important to the preservation of our liberties. Also, if most of the people were vigilant most of
the time in defending their inalienable rights, no written Constitution would
be necessary. Or, as James Madison said, "if men were angels, no government
would be necessary." That keen French observer of our society, Alexis de
Tocqueville, was profoundly right when he described as the prime function of
our Constitution:
". .. to sustain liberty during those intervals wherein the human
mind is otherwise occupied-to give [liberty] a kind of vegetative
life, which may keep it in existence during those periods of inattention.
The forms of a free government allow men to become temporarily
weary of their liberty without losing it."71
Opponents of the amendment who recognize the danger of treaty law
contend that the danger of amending the Constitution is much greater. They
say that it is impossible to predict how the courts will interpret key words and
phrases of the amendment. There is some truth in this contention. No one
in 1791, for example, could foretell how the courts would interpret the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment. If we must know exactly how new
constitutional language will be' applied to all hypothetical situations, we must
regard our Constitution as a completed document, save for the possibility of
adding amendments dealing with such purely technical problems as qualifications
and tenure of office. The Founding Fathers were neither vain nor inflexible.
They stipulated procedures of amendment so that the Constitution-not by farfetched construction but by the consent of the people-could be revised to
cope with the new problems of future generations. Few deny that the treatymaking activities of the United Nations and United States participation in the
Organization are revolutionary developments.
70 See Hearings II at 824, 829.
71 DETocQUEVILL,

DEMOCRACY IN AMERic;A, KIRK, THE CONSERVAT1VE MIND 191, 152 (1953).
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The charge of ambiguity is most frequently leveled against the word
"conflicts" in Section 1 of the amendment. That portion of the amendment
would simply revitalize Supreme Court dicta to the effect that any treaty which
conflicts with the Constitution or which surrenders sovereign powers of the
United States is null and void. 72 If that venerable dicta is still the law, as opponents of the amendment claim, reasserting it in a constitutional amendment
will not make the Constitution more ambiguous.
Opponents also charge that the phrase, "internal law" is inherently vague.
At the same time, they contend that no amendment is needed because Congress
can repeal the internal law effect of any treaty. An inherently vague remedy?
The requirement of S. J. Res. 1 that all treaties be implemented by appropriate legislation is variously described by opponents as "cumbersome,"
"awkward," and "time-consuming." But in citing the power of Congress to
repeal dangerous treaties, opponents refer to a "simple Act of Congress," ignoring both the probability of a Presidential veto and the certainty of international
recriminations.
Opponents' most popular argument against my amendment, and the most
false, is that it would require certain treaties to be ratified by the 48 States.
All that would be required is that in negotiating treaties dealing with domestic
matters the reserved powers of the states be protected by a typical federal-state
clause. 73 But, say opponents, some treaties involving matters of great national
concern could not be made because the Congressional power to implement such
treaties would not exist. This is, of course, the fallacy to which Holmes fell
victim in the Holland case. For Holmes recognized, and rightly so, that the
protection of migratory birds was a matter "of the sharpest exigency for the
national well-being"; that control of wild game was a national interest of
"nearly the first magnitude." His mistake was in assuming the Congress impotent to legislate on some matters of vital national concern without the aid
of a treaty. In other words, we are supposed to believe that there are some national interests "of nearly the first magnitude" with which the national government cannot deal unless it can obtain the consent of a foreign power. Dr.
George A. Finch, Vice-Chairman of the ABA Committee on Peace and Law
Through United Nations, called this

"...

an utterly absurd dogma in either

constitutional or international law.' 74
Another favorite argument against constitutional insurance in treaty-making
is that we haven't been hurt yet. The identical argument was advanced in
opposition to ratification of the Bill of Rights. Since no fundamental rights
had been infringed, Alexander Hamilton argued in the 84th Federalist Paper
that bills of rights "are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution, but
would even be dangerous." History has proved Hamilton wrong.
72 See note 20, supra.
73 See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, art. 19, par. 7.
74 See Hearings III at 505.
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The case for relying exclusively on political action to prevent abuse of
75
the treaty-making power has been forcefully argued by Mr. Jon Magnusson.
The following is a fair summary of Mr. Magnusson's postulates:
"Assuming for the sake or argument that there is some doubt
as to whether conditions such as the conduct of a private business in
this country can be made the object of federal control as the result of
foreign negotiations, is it proper for the courts to resolve this doubt?"
(The author concludes that judicial intervention would be improper).76
"The many subjects which the United Nations may be expected
to dredge up for its attention and action will unquestionably be those
which have hitherto been within the province of state action, or congressional action, rather than executive action . . . So, when a new

authority usurps the handling of old problems it is hastily labeled
as presumptively unconstitutional until the new agent can show a quo
warranto . . . Actually, the only local thing about the problem is
one's own provincialism. " 77 (Emphasis added).
"When representatives of our Government attempt to secure to
our citizens equality of social or commercial advantages with the citizens of other nations . . . their work should be unhampered by any
ill-defined or uncertain constitutional limitations. Equality of advantage and privilege will be the undoubted purpose of international agreements formulated by the United Nations. Such a purpose is surely consistent with our national welfare and will aid78 in securing and advancing
our position in the community of nations."
And this is Mr. Magnusson's conclusion:
"Facing an election every four years, the president is hardly going
to attempt to parlay a domestic issue into an international agreement
if it is politically inexpedient. Nor will senators seal off their chances

76 See Magnusson, supra note 47.
76 Id. at 158.
77 Id. at 160.
78 Id. at 161. But compare the following statement by Dr. Charles Malik of Lebanon made at
the time he was Chairman of the UN Human Rights Commission:
"I think a study of our proceedings will reveal that the amendments we adopted
to the old texts under examination responded for the most part more to Soviet than
to western promptings. For the second year an unsuccessful attempt was made to include an article on the right to own property . . . The concept of property and its ownership is at the heart of the great ideological conflict of the present day. It was not
only the Communist representatives who riddled this concept with questions and doubts,
a goodly portion of the non-Communist world had itself succumbed to these doubts.
A study of this particular debate will reveal the extent to which the non-Communist
world has been communistically softened or frightened. It seems incredible that in
these economic matters, which reflect indeed much more than mere economic divergencies, the western world is so divided itself as to be incapable of presenting a common front against communism." Malik, Human Rights in the United Nations, 13 U.
N. BULL. 243 (1952).
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of re-election by voting on agreements that many people consider only
remotely related to international life.
"Political expediency should be the real check on any unrestrained
use of the treaty power. Certainly the judiciary should not be called
upon to hold up a restraining hand against the consequences of our
participation in the United Nations. Logic, legal precedent and the language of the Constitution do not indicate
that the judiciary should re79
strain the use of the treaty power.
My disagreement with Mr. Magnusson's utopian and internationalist philosophy requires no further elaboration. However, the gentleman's theory of
politics is incredibly naive.
The President and Senators of the United States act on literally thousands
of important problems during their respective terms of office. To suggest that
support of a treaty, a provision of which is later interpreted to cut across a
constitutional right, will spell the political doom of a President or a Senator
reveals an Alice-in-Wonderland view of the political scene. A casual reading
of the newspapers preceding each general election would show that "pocketbook" issues are usually dominant.
Of course, the ballot box restrains abuse of all political power, including the
treaty power. However, liberty in America would have vanished long ago if
"political expediency" had been the primary check on tyranny. After all, each
voter in a Presidential election is only one of 60,000,000 seeking to give direction to the Executive Branch. On the other hand, not even a 99.9%, majority can violate the individual's inalienable rights so long as the Constitution is
generally accepted as the embodiment of binding and timeless political truths.
All issues in the current debate on a treaty-control amendment eventually merge
in the question of whether we prefer "a government of laws, not of men."
79 See Magnusson, supra note 47 at 163.

